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Remarks by Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation John C. Rood Escerpted from Press Conference

Astana, Kazakhstan
Monday, June 11, 2007


Assistant Secretary Rood: Thank you, Sergey, for those kind words. We have truly come a long way in the last year since President Bush and President Putin launched this Global Initiative to combat nuclear terrorism.

Today we saw representatives of nearly 40 nations, as well as the IAEA and the EU come together here in Kazakhstan as a large group of the more than 50 nations that have now joined this Global Initiative. It is fitting that we're having this conference here in Astana, Kazakhstan, given the track record of the government of Kazakhstan in both fighting terrorism and in their historic, their nonproliferation track record which includes a historic decision to abandon their nuclear weapons.

I want to join Sergey in congratulating the Kazakh government for the fine work they've done in this conference, but it's more than just the work in hosting the conference. The Kazakhstani government has put forward a substantive program of work that they are willing to do as part of this Global Initiative and indeed, the government of Kazakhstan has been with us for quite some time in this initiative and is again making a substantive contribution in an important security area.

This is a vitally important security initiative. When we look at the potential damage that could occur from a nuclear attack by terrorists, either involving an improvised nuclear devise or a radioactive dispersal device, the consequences are quite grave and therefore it�s essential that we bring together the international community to deal with this problem.

We continue to see nuclear smuggling incidents occur with some regularity. While most involve material that would not be useable for a nuclear weapon, some are particularly concerning. This occurs against a backdrop of growing interest by terrorist groups in nuclear weapons. Which is why we are pleased that not only a large number of countries have joined this initiative, but they have put forward a very strong program of work over the next two years to establish a framework and foundation for further cooperation, and to improve the capabilities of the individual nations, and this group as a whole to tackle this very important issue.

Let me just close by congratulating the participants today in making this a very substantive discussion that focused on all of the critical areas that would be necessary in order to make a terrorist attack much less likely, and for the growth of this initiative, not just in numbers, but the strengthening and deepening of the actual activities of the group which will yield benefits I think in reducing the likelihood that a catastrophic nuclear attack could take place.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kazykhanov: I would like to use this opportunity to congratulate our co-chairman for a wonderfully organized discussion today. It will continue tomorrow [inaudible]. Now we probably have time for a couple of questions. I'm open to them.

Question: Would you tell us how the United States views the [inaudible] initiative [inaudible] uranium enrichment [inaudible] which will be open to examination from the international community and the United States view in terms of concerns about proliferation of nuclear technology.

Assistant Secretary Rood: The United States supports the initiative that both the government of Russia and with the participation of the government of Kazakhstan have undertaken for the Angarsk Multinational Fuel Center. Enriched uranium can be used for reactor fuel, but as you know, it can also be enriched to levels where it is useable in nuclear weapons.

The challenge of providing a reliable supply of fuel for nuclear reactors without contributing to the proliferation problems is important and this particular center in Angarsk, we think, is a practical way that nations like Russia and Kazakhstan can come together to try to address that problem.

We also think in the United States that there are other complementary initiatives to address this problem that have merit. For instance, we've cooperated with the Russian Federation and five other countries on an Assured Fuel Supply Initiative. We in the United States have an initiative called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. All of these efforts are intended to address the same problem and we think there�s value in having some diversity of efforts to address this issue.

Question: Could you please tell us to what extent the issues of security of nuclear testing grounds worldwide have been addressed and what countries are most vulnerable in that respect.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kazykhanov: To whom are you addressing this question? All of us?

Speaking of Kazakhstan I would like to say first of all that already over several years we have a rather [inaudible] system of export controls accounting and protected storage for nuclear materials and sensitive facilities. As you know, all nuclear [facilities] on Kazakhstan territory falls under the regulatory oversight framework of IAEA and [inaudible] the national agencies as well.

As was already noted, [inaudible] joint efforts in [inaudible] with the United States. We also have vast experience of cooperation with the Russian situation.

As you know, Kazakhstan was home to one of the former nuclear testing grounds. Efforts to strengthen the physical security of that proving ground and other sensitive [inaudible] facilities do continue. It's a very special issue, security of proving grounds. Our providing round Denova is very well secured indeed. I cannot imagine accessing terrorist to that proving ground. But more importantly is to say that right now we haven't actually tested for many years, neither in Russia, nor in the United States, nor anywhere else. I believe that from an environmental perspective that's the most important answer to the many questions asked in this regard.

Question: I have two questions for Mr. Rood. Many experts state that [inaudible] U.S. suggests on the need to [inaudible] missiles in Europe is not valid because those missiles you are afraid of cannot possibly reach the United States. This may be a back door effort to address both domestic political needs and long term [inaudible]. Secondly, how does Washington perceive Putin's offer to set up the radar [inaudible] on Azerbaijan?

Assistant Secretary Rood: The United States' assessment is that the missile threat that both we face and our allies face continues to grow. We saw last summer North Korea conduct a series of missile launches, including one of its Taepo Dong II intercontinental ballistic missile which has a range capable of reaching the United States. While this particular test feailed, we do think this is a system of great concern to the United States which is why last summer during those missile launches by North Korea the United States activated its missile defense system for the first time, which we manned for 24 hours a day.

We have seen continued missile development in Iran which concerns us, both using their indigenous resources, receiving some foreign assistance, and the potential that Iran could again purchase a complete missile system from abroad is of concern as well and could contribute to an even more rapid growth in the missile threat from that country than we presently project.

But it is not only Iran and North Korea that possess missiles. Today about two dozen countries either possess missiles or are working to develop them and we have seen a continued growth in the sophistication of these missiles over the period of time that - remember, these missiles have only been around for a few decades and over that period of time we've continued to see them become more capable and more sophisticated.

We think a limited missile defense system like what we have proposed to place in Europe would make an important contribution to both dissuading countries from investing in these capabilities, deterring their launch, and ultimately, if necessary, providing protection to both the United States and our European allies in NATO.

I would hasten to add that we have discussed this on several occasions at NATO and as the NATO Secretary General has stated in public, all allies agree there is a missile threat within NATO. This is a commonly agreed view.

President Putin's recent proposal in this area is important and something that we in the United States find interesting and hope to have follow-on discussions with our Russian colleagues at the experts level to explore. The United States is interested in missile defense cooperation with Russia and we�re hopeful that perhaps this imitative could be a way that we could achieve this objective. Thank you.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak: I would like to add a few words to that. Although this is beyond the scope of our press conference, it is beyond the area where we have the most intense cooperation with the United States. Yet since you asked this question I would like to add a few words.

First of all, President Putin did not offer to deploy anti-missile defense in Azerbaijan which was the way you formulated your question. Mr. Putin�s suggestion was to use the facilities of a radar array in [inaudible] which was built back in Soviet times and which Russia currently leases from Azerbaijan. It is controlled and retained by all military.

The idea of setting up anti-missile defense system in Azerbaijan is [inaudible] territory. We�re talking about using existing [inaudible] capability [inaudible] capacities, which [inaudible] acknowledges. [Inaudible] capable of tracking any launches [inaudible] Middle Eastern area that is the area of greatest concern.

We proceed from [inaudible]. This issue [inaudible]. The [inaudible] issue which follows this, establishment of two such bases [inaudible]. This is also the [inaudible]. [Inaudible] is not clear to us and [inaudible] disagree with [inaudible]. The [inaudible] is the use already with [inaudible] and capabilities [inaudible]. [Inaudible] provides [inaudible] warning and further mutual trust and cooperation. That was the essence of Mr. Putin's suggestion.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kazykhanov: I would like to thank all the representatives of the media for your patience. I�ve mentioned that we will have a media bridge between Astana and Miami [inaudible], so let�s relocate to another room. Thank you all.

Assistant Secretary Rood: One other announcement that we would make briefly is that the two co-chairs -- the Russian Federation and the United States -- have a statement that we will release now which describes today�s meeting, the participation, and some of the discussion areas, and we�ll make that available to the media.

We will now go to the videoconference with the Director of the U.S. FBI, the Deputy Director of the Russian FSB, and they will report on a conference which is taking place in Miami, Florida in the United States with over 500 representatives of 20 nations from the law enforcement community.

Question: Within the Global Initiative --

Assistant Secretary Rood: Yes. Just to be clear, that is an activity undertaken pursuant to this Global Initiative to combat nuclear terrorism.